Classified By: Amb. Charles P. Ries. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
1. (C) Summary. Senior Greek officials continue to express
concern about the level of Turkish air activity in the
Aegean. At the same time, statistics recently released by
the MOD paint a more positive picture of the actual situation
in the region. Greek officials insist that, the content and
tone of this briefing notwithstanding, there has been no
change in Athens, Aegean policy. Nevertheless, we intend to
capitalize on this relatively good news to urge the Greeks to
break out of the Aegean stalemate. End summary.
FM Focussed on Quantity, Not Quality
------------------------------------
2. (C) Reviewing the PM's May 20 meeting with the
President, FM Molyviatis reiterated to Ambassador May 25 the
Greek argument that high Turkish sortie rates in the Aegean
made it increasingly difficult for the Greek government to
defend its cooperation with Turkey in other areas, including
the EU. Molyviatis emphasized that Turkey did not need to
send 40 aircraft a day across the disputed airspace to make
its political point; they could, he insisted, send one flight
a week and accomplish the same purpose. If the Turks pursued
a less inflammatory policy in the Aegean, he suggested, there
would be much more sympathy for Turkey in Greece.
3. (C) Ambassador questioned whether Greece drew a fine
enough distinction between Turkish airspace violations and
Turkish non-notifications of the FIR, reminding Molyviatis
that the U.S. did not file FIR notifications either. It was
important for Greece to be on solid ground when it reckoned
up the number of "violations." Molyviatis acknowledged that
there was a legal difference between violations of the
six-mile limit versus FIR notifications. He admitted that
the Greek nouns for "violation" ("paraviasi," used for
intrusions into national airspace) and "infringement"
("paravasi," used for flights in the Athens FIR) are nearly
indistinguishable, even to Greeks. Ambassador suggested
Greek credibility with partners would be helped if they made
an issue only of Turkish violations with six nautical miles
of Greek territory, where the numbers are much smaller and
international law is clearer.
MOD Statistics Paint a (Relatively) Positive Picture
--------------------------------------------- -------
4. (SBU) Meanwhile, two prominent pro-government newspapers
reported on a Ministry of Defense briefing on Turkish air
activity in the Aegean that was given to journalists
accompanying MOD Spiliotopoulos on his May 30 visit to the
Greek air operations center in Larisa. Despite negative
headlines (e.g., &Confrontation in the Aegean8 and
&Provocations by the Numbers8), the content of the articles
was strikingly positive. Both articles avoided the word
"infringement" (paravasi) when discussing Turkish flights in
the Athens FIR, using instead the more neutral term "incoming
aircraft" (eiselthonda aeroskafi). (Asked about this
apparent effort to tone down the rhetoric, MOD staffers
insisted that the tone of the articles was the result of
editorial decisions and not a change or softening of the
government's stance.) Additionally, by breaking down
statistics on Turkish violations of Greek airspace into two
categories -- flights within 6 nautical miles of Greek
territory and those that penetrated to between 6 and 10
nautical miles -- the MOD briefing tacitly accepted the fact
that the Greek definition of its national airspace is
disputed. Finally, the MOD briefing compared 2005 figures
with those from 2003 (i.e., discounting statistics from 2004,
when Turkey reduced its Aegean profile as an Olympic goodwill
gesture), revealing what even officials at MOD and MFA
admitted was a positive trend.
5. (C) The Greek MOD figures claim there were 1625 Turkish
violations of Greek airspace during the first five months of
2003; the figure for the corresponding period in 2005 was
830. Equally significant, the Greek figures show that the
majority -- almost 60 percent -- of reported violations in
2005 occurred between six and ten nautical miles from Greek
territory (i.e., beyond what Turkey and most other countries
recognize as Greek airspace). This marks a signficant change
from 2003, when the Greeks claimed that 75 percent of Turkish
aircraft that violated Greek airspace flew within 6 nautical
miles of Greek territory. The MOD figures also show a
remarkable decline in the number of "mock dogfights" between
Greek and Turkish jets over the Aegean. According to Greek
statistics, in the first five months of 2003, Greek and
Turkish jets were involved in 593 mock dogfights; in Jan-May
2005 this had dropped by 80 percent, to 106. In a briefing
for journalists, MOD officials credited this drop to a
decision by the Turkish General Staff to order its pilots to
be cautious and avoid potential accidents.
Turks Sending the Same Message in Athens, Ankara
--------------------------------------------- ---
6. (C) Turkish embassy political officer Hakkan Abaci gave
poloff the same message as the one reported reftel. The
Turkish government genuinely wanted to solve Aegean issues
with Greece, he said, but was frustrated that its decision to
notify NATO (and thus, effectively, Greece) of flights in the
Athens FIR had yielded no positive response from Greece.
Instead, the Greek Air Force used the information to
intercept Turkish jets and the Greek government continued to
attack these "FIR infringements" in the media and in
discussions with other countries. Ankara was still mulling
this policy change, Abaci emphasized, and had not discussed
the matter with Greece. When pressed, Abaci (who will take
over the Aegean air/sea portfolio at the Turkish MFA this
fall) said he was not suggesting that the United States play
a role in Aegean airspace issues or inform the Greek
government of the possible change in Turkish policy. Poloff
commented that a change in Turkish notification policy would
cede the high ground Ankara currently had on the subject and
undermine Turkey's stated goal of resolving Aegean issues.
Asked whether the tone of the news coverage of Defense
Minister Spiliotopoulos's trip to Larisa would help, Abaci
said Ankara would undoubtedly first wait to see if a pattern
developed.
Comment
-------
7. (C) By raising Aegean issues with the President on May
20, PM Karamanlis has invited our comments on this
longstanding dispute that diverts Greek military resources
from more important NATO or coalition operations and which
could, in the event of an accident during mock dogfights,
lead to a crisis between two NATO Allies. In many ways,
Greece has created the problem for iteslf by dramatizing the
lack of FIR notice while pocketing the NATO flight plans. We
will use the ammunition provided by these latest figures
released by MOD to encourage the Greeks to ratchet down their
rhetoric, focus on six-mile airspace violations, and look for
ways to further Greece's long-term goal of improving ties
with Turkey, rather than score short-term points in a no-win
game.
RIES
CONTINUED GREEK ANGST, BUT POSITIVE NUMBERS ON AEGEAN AIRSPACE ISSUES
| CONTINUED GREEK ANGST, BUT POSITIVE NUMBERS ON AEGEAN AIRSPACE ISSUES | |
|
2005 June 3, 07:24 (Friday)
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